27/11/2008

Oxford Research Group (ORG)
November 26, 2008
Reported by http://www.reliefweb.int

Executive Summary

The Arab Peace Initiative (API), proposed in March 2002 by all 22 members of the Arab League, offered a definitive end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, full recognition for the State of Israel, and the establishment of normal relations and mutual guarantees of future security. In exchange, the API asked for full Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in June 1967, including Syrian and Lebanese territories, a just settlement to the Palestinian refugee problem 'to be agreed upon' in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194, and the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem.

The meeting recognised the API as a remarkable and historic document, effectively reversing the three 'noes' of the 1967 Khartoum Arab Summit (no peace, no recognition, no negotiation with Israel). It is the only regional peace proposal on offer and is widely regarded as the 'only show in town' that encompasses the three sets of bilateral negotiations (with Palestinians, Syria, Lebanon) within a comprehensive multilateral framework. It has been reaffirmed most recently at the Damascus summit in 2008.

The consensus was that the API offers the outline of an agreement that is very much in the strategic interest of Israel. It was seen as a deal that the founders of the State of Israel would surely have embraced with characteristic boldness, and negotiated with vigour. Participants agreed that there is no alternative framework that does or can effectively guarantee the future of a Jewish democratic state on 78% of mandate Palestine within a context of regional recognition and cooperation. In the words of one participant, the API offers to "provide future generations with security, stability and prosperity" after 60 years of conflict and bloodshed.

Yet from March 2002 onwards the API "has been greeted with a yawn by the Israeli government" and has aroused remarkably little public interest in the country. This was seen to be partly due to its timing, coinciding as it did with the beginning of the outbreak of the second (al-Aqsa) Intifada, the early months of the Sharon government which rejected the premise on which the API was constructed, and the Bush administration's reorientation of US policy as a 'war on terror' after the 11 September 2001 attacks.

This has been compounded not only by a continuing widespread ignorance in Israel about what the API proposes but also by an ongoing unwillingness to give up tangible control of territory that gives security in exchange for what are seen as unreliable future promises in an atmosphere of mutual lack of confidence, suspicion and fear. Internal divisions within Israel and the Palestinian Authority, together with weak leadership, have so far rendered bilateral Israel-Palestinian negotiations ineffective. The incremental nature of the 2003 Road Map and Israel's strategy of 'unilateral separation' entirely sidelined the API in the years up to 2007. And it was not mentioned in the Joint Understanding that initiated the Annapolis summit on 27 November 2007 even though this revived final-status negotiations.

However, a recent revitalisation of interest in the API, in some Israeli and Palestinian circles, was noted. There are indications that the mood in Israel is changing from an exclusive focus on bilateral Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian negotiations to calls for a comprehensive regional peace, which would represent a marked departure in Israel's diplomatic strategy. A number of shifts were identified in the conflict environment, requiring a restructuring of the international framework for advancing Middle East peace processes. At leadership level, President Shimon Peres has appealed for Israel to "stop holding separate negotiations and go for a regional peace agreement with the Arab states and the Arab League". It is important that this advocacy does not get obscured by elections in Israel in February/March 2009.

Similarly, President Mahmoud Abbas has stated, after attempted reconciliation talks with Hamas in October 2008, that "all eyes must now be set on the peace initiative, which is no longer an Arab proposal, but also an Islamic one since many Islamic countries have also endorsed it" - including the 55 members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Further, the meeting was advised by a well-informed participant that "the Arab League achieved significant progress in convincing Hamas not to depart from Arab consensus on issues pertaining to the Arab Israeli conflict and to accept a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders" - although this was later jeopardised by the international boycott. The Arab League is ready to re-engage Hamas on these issues if and when the context changes.

In light of this analysis, the roundtable concluded that now is the moment:

1. To make a concerted effort to arouse interest in and knowledge of the API in Israel with a view to persuading the Israeli government to respond positively with a complementary initiative of its own.

2. To explore what the Arab world would expect by way of an Israeli response sufficient to trigger renewed Arab engagement, and what reciprocal moves could then increase general support and build confidence and momentum. 3. To specify what role the international community can play in this context.

Israeli participants undertook to mount a major publicity campaign in Israel aimed at decision makers, policy experts and the general public. The aim would be to acquaint Israelis with the details of the API and to elicit a positive official response from the Israeli government and mirror the Arab initiative by putting forward its basic principles for a comprehensive regional settlement. Among the points in the API to be highlighted would be:

1. That for the first time Arab states refer to 'East Jerusalem' as the capital of a future Palestinian state rather than 'Holy Jerusalem' or equivalent; thus implying a future recognition of West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

2. That, again for the first time, an "agreed upon" solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees is called for, albeit in the context of UN Resolution 194.

The phrasing of these points gives scope for negotiations of detail on these vital matters. From earlier attempts to reach agreements, it is understood that final border specification and interim security arrangements are also matters to be mutually determined.

There was a sense among Arab participants that following an adequate initial Israeli response to the API, Arab leaders would be ready to rally waning popular support for the Initiative in the Arab world and make further concerted efforts to explain and promote the API to the Israeli public.

The key Israeli actions that would have an immediate positive effect in the Arab world were identified as a properly monitored and effective freezing of Israeli settlements and determined steps to dismantle illegal outposts. Negotiations are futile while there is continued settlement expansion, which threatens the very viability of a future Palestinian state. If progress were successfully initiated in this way, reciprocal gestures to build confidence and generate momentum could be orchestrated. In this context, some participants mentioned the electrifying effect of President Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977.

International participants felt that the international community needs to respond robustly to the API's invitation to "all countries and all organisations to support this initiative", bearing in mind its appeal in particular to "the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim States, and the European Union." Up until now the international community has been lacking in unity of purpose and has been far too indecisive.

The four main roles for the international community were identified to be:

1. To apply persistent political pressure and support to advance the principles of the API.

2. To offer monitoring and facilitate other confidence-building capacity.

3 To give reliable security guarantees through the (unavoidably) vulnerable transition processes.

4 To provide whatever funding may be required – for example crucially by way of compensation and rehabilitation for Palestinian refugees as appropriate, and also through continued financial and commercial incentives in general.

The general mood was that, despite the current political uncertainties in Israel and Palestine, and the untried character of the new US administration, the revival of the API together with an appropriate Israeli response offers the best – indeed the only – framework for a comprehensive peace agreement to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. The dangers of failing to do this were also spelled out:

- Continued indefinite Israeli rule over the whole of Palestine would mean that there is already effectively a form of 'one-state' outcome that is not sustainable given that for Israel, in the light of demographic trends, it would mean an end to either the Jewish or the democratic nature of the state; and for Palestinians it would mean the indefinite continuation of occupation and the denial of their independence and self-determination.

- Without Israeli reciprocation, support for the API will inevitably continue to dwindle in the Arab world – perhaps fatally – together with an erosion of belief in a two-state outcome among Palestinians. - In the wake of failure in the Annapolis negotiations and an absence of new initiatives, the rapid radicalisation of both Arab youth and militant Jewish settlers will continue to accelerate – readily exploitable by the enemies of any peace agreement. The prospect can only be one of mounting violence and instability.